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The Double-Faced Law
FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO
The word crisis has been so worn out by use and abuse that it now tends to be 
confused with statistical banality. Any kind of stumbling block or breakdown 
in regularity is qualifi ed as a crisis. A return to its semantic origins, therefore, is 
needed to dispel misconceptions.
Krisis, in classical Greek, is a noun associated with the verb krinô, whose 
three basic meanings are: 1) to separate, choose, compare; 2) to judge, decide, 
condemn; 3) to estimate, believe. With regard to the second meaning, we have 
kritês, judge, and
kritêrion, the basis for one’s judgment.
It was Hippocrates who gave the word a precise technical sense. In his 
treaty On airs, waters and places, the Father of Medicine designated krisis the 
exact moment when it is possible to discern (the verb cerno, -ere, in Latin, 
connects with the Greek etymon krinô) a disease and uncover the fate of a 
patient. It is the moment when the doctor’s trained eye sees a sudden change 
in the state of the patient, for better or for worse; the moment that clearly 
reveals the symptoms of the disease and enables a diagnosis and a prognosis.
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In face of the proliferation of scandals in the Brazilian Congress, we are 
naturally led to ask whether we have reached a decisive historical moment in 
which it is possible to discern the etiology of our political malaise and predict its 
outcome.
Having absolutely no wish to answer this question, I confi ne myself here 
to attempt a historical explanation for the evils that chronically affl ict us.
The Duplicity of the Brazilian Legal Systems
In “The Mirror,” a short story by Machado de Assis, the narrator assures 
his amazed listeners that each of us has two souls. An external one, which we 
display to others and by which we judge ourselves from the outside in; and an 
internal one, rarely exposed to the outside eyes, with which we judge the world 
and ourselves from the inside out.
I believe something similar happens with regard to the Brazilian legal 
corpus. In every country, there is an explicit law, but there is also an implicit law, 
hidden from prying eyes, that regulates the facts concerning what might be called 
the intimate life of the nation.
Historical examples of this legal dualism abound. I will recall here just one. 
Soon after the French Revolution, the aristocrat Joseph de Maistre stated that 
France was then divided into two countries: the legal one and the real one. For 
him, the radical changes made in the political regime after 1789 were confi ned to 
the surface of things. The country remained monarchical, as it had always been, 
and split into the traditional three estates: the clergy, the nobility and the people.
To be sure, if things are properly analyzed from outside academic 
dogmatism, we cannot but recognize that, unlike what the 18th century American 
and French revolutionaries thought, a Constitution is not merely a document 
for the political organization of a country. Underlying this form – or, if you will, 
on the reverse side of it – lies another reality, equally normative, but without an 
offi cial seal of approval. Just like the politeia of the city-states of classical Greece, 
it resembles an unwritten, but unquestionably valid Constitution. It is established 
by traditional practices and customs, the prevailing values of society and the 
complex fi eld of private powers, intertwined with public jurisdiction.
If we cast our eyes on Brazil, we will recognize, without much analytical 
effort, that the Constitutions here promulgated, when seen through the external 
soul referred to by the narrator of “The Mirror,” are invariably clothed in 
gala costumes and proudly displayed to foreigners as evidence of our civilized 
character. They resemble liturgical garments, worn by doctors and magistrates 
in offi cial ceremonies of worship. For daily household use, however, we naturally 
prefer to wear simpler and more comfortable clothes.
Because of this institutional duplicity, corresponding to the two faces 
of our national character, we have managed to live quite smoothly, throughout 
our history, with a series of “unfortunate misunderstandings,” in the famous 
expression of Sérgio Buarque de Holanda. People at large were conspicuously 
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absent from all of them, however, and most of the confl icts that emerged among 
the ruling classes were solved by agreement or a conciliation of opposing parties.
Our Independence did not stem from a revolt of the Brazilian people 
against the king of Portugal, but from a rebellion of the Portuguese people 
against the king in Brazil. In Grito do Ipiranga [The Call at the Ipiranga], the 
celebrated painting by Pedro Américo [depicting the alleged moment of the 
proclamation of Independence], the artist unwittingly symbolized the Brazilian 
people in the fi gure of a coachman by the roadside, barefooted and bare-chested, 
contemplating the heroic scene in fascination, as if asking himself what was the 
meaning of all that pomp and circumstance.
Soon after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1823, the 
emperor declared he was determined to grant the nation a Constitution 
“duplicately more liberal” than the one being drafted. The Constitutional 
Charter, a document imposed on the Brazilian people from above, completely 
omitted any reference, however perfunctory, to slavery. Clearly, great care was 
taken to establish a “manor house liberalism,” so to speak, to which, for reasons 
of fundamental decency, the “nameless vile populace” mentioned by Camões 
should not have access.
The military revolt in Campo de Santana on November 15, 1889, which the 
people gawked at as if bestialized, in Aristides Lobo’s famous expression, did not 
aim to abolish the Monarchy, but simply to unseat the liberal ministry of Afonso 
Celso de Assis Figueiredo [Viscount of Ouro Preto]. It did not cross the mind of 
any of the intellectual leaders of the movement, all of them positivists, to oppose 
this anti-republican centuries-old practice. Already in the early 17th century friar 
Vicente do Salvador[lamented that “not one man in this land is a republican, or 
cares for or looks after the common good, but only their private assets”. 
The Revolution of 1930 was triggered by a desire to end the distortions 
of the representative system, rigged elections being a common practice of 
local chieftains. After not many years, the revolution had transfi gured into a 
dictatorship with broad popular acceptance.
The peaceful transition from authoritarianism to constitutional rule, at 
the end of both Getúlio Vargas’ Estado Novo and the two decades of military 
regime forty years later, was assured by the enactment of amnesty laws to political 
opponents. This was the explicit law. Underlying it, however, was the implicit 
law that amnesty would be extended to public offi cials and their accomplices 
responsible for tortures, summary executions, the disappearance of political foes 
and other unspeakable abuses.
Therefore, what we have seen in all these historical episodes was not the 
replacement of a juridical regime by another, but an amalgam of the new and 
the old, of abrogated law and abrogative law. The former, although invited to 
leave the front stage, did not withdraw from the juridical theater: it was simply 
consigned to the background, a still unforgotten character, waiting to emerge on 
the scene at a timely moment.
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Apparently, two-faced Janus, the Roman god of gates and doors, has been 
an effective guardian angel of our ruling classes. When the explicit law does not 
go against their interests, they exalt it as the only legitimate and enforceable law. 
However, as soon as the slightest contradiction arises between constitutional or 
legal precepts and the power that these classes effectively detain and exercise in 
society, the communication doors of explicit law open automatically, allowing 
the admission of other, previously hidden rulings that legitimize and validate the 
traditional status dominii. In some cases, as we’ll see regarding the deliverance of 
slaves, a more fl exible and generous common law was developed side by side with 
the strictness of explicit law. 
Incidentally, that is why capitalism was so quick to grow deep roots amidst 
us. Because one of the main features of the “spirit” of capitalism, which Max Weber 
did not point out in his famous essay1, is its chameleonic ability to conceal real facts 
with the mantle of ideology. The evocation of individual freedom is always used to 
justify the submission of workers, consumers and of the State itself to the dominant 
power of businesses in the marketplace. The principle of equality under law hides 
the systematic domination of the poor by the rich, of consumers by producers, of 
ignorant and unwise users by the utilities. Napoleon was right – not the Corsican, 
but the dictator pig in George Orwell’s Animal farm – when he warned that “all 
animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”
To uncover the origins of the dual character of Brazilian law, we must 
undoubtedly go back to the time when the Portuguese colonized these lands. 
The written law – the Ordinances of the Kingdom, in addition to all the 
later laws, provisions and permits – came from the mother country, that is, reeked 
of imported rules, alien to our milieu. These rules commanded respect, but 
not necessarily obedience. The maxim that was disseminated all over Hispanic 
America also prevailed here: las Ordenanzas del Rey Nuestro Señor se acatán 
pero no se cumplen [“the Ordinances of Our Lord the King are heeded but not 
complied with”].
To the establishment, year after year, of this veritable system of trompe 
l’oeil, as the French would say, whereby the offi cial law was artifi cially highlighted 
to create the illusion that it corresponded to reality, much contributed the offi cials 
sent from Portugal, who, upon arriving here, often joined the families of wealthy 
local masters through godfathering or even marriage – or, alternatively, acquired 
land and went themselves into the crop exporting business2.
Under such conditions, it is easier to understand how great were the 
pressures to provide the metropolitan-originated laws a less literal interpretation 
more in tune with the economic interests of those who had settled here. In a letter 
to D. João VI, dated April 4, 1654, the priest Antonio Vieira complained (p. 173):
Everything in this state, the inordinate greed of those who govern it has 
destroyed; yet, even after razing it, they cease not the means to consume it 
even further. [The states of] Maranhão and Pará are Portugal’s La Rochelle, a 
conquest to be conquered, a land where Your Majesty is cited, but not obeyed.
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After the Independence, two examples serve perfectly to illustrate what I 
have just stated: the slavery of Africans and African descendants, and the reaction 
of our ruling groups to the idea of establishing a democracy in our midst.
The Two Faces of the Slavery
The Constitution of 1824 declared that “whipping, torture, hot iron 
branding and all other cruel punishments are hereby abolished” (art. 179, XIX).
In 1830, however, a Criminal Code was enacted that included chain 
gangs as a means of punishment, as described in article 44, subjecting “culprits 
to walk with clamps and irons on their feet, together or separately, and be 
employed in the public works of the province where they committed their offense, 
at the Government’s disposal. “ Needless to say that this kind of punishment, 
considered humane by the 1830 legislators, actually applied only to slaves.
There was more. Despite the explicit constitutional prohibition, captives 
continued to branded with hot iron and regularly fl ogged until right before the 
Abolition – more precisely, until the law of October 16, 1886. Article 60 of the 
same Criminal Code established a maximum of fi fty whippings a day, but the 
legal provision was never respected. It was common for the poor devils to endure 
two hundred lashes daily. That legislation was only enacted by the Chamber 
of Deputies because, not long before, two of four slaves condemned to three 
hundred lashes by a jury trial in Paraiba do Sul died.
Not to mention mutilating punishments, such as having all of one’s teeth 
broken, the fi ngers chopped off or the breasts pierced.
Interestingly, this harsh reality was never recognized by our ill-named 
elite. Writing in 1866 a treatise on slavery in Brazil, Perdigão Malheiro was keen 
to stress the “the admittedly compassionate and humanitarian disposition of the 
Brazilians,” our “proverbially kind” temperament. Gilberto Freyre (1947, p. 108 
ff.), in turn, backed by the testimony of foreigners who visited our country in 
the early 19th century, argued that hereabouts slavery was more benign than that 
practiced in the English colonies.
Although constantly soft-pedaled, it is undeniable that an unoffi cial law 
of slavery never ceased to exist. A good example is the fact that the slave trade 
continued for many and many years, in a situation of blatant illegality.
An ordinance dated January 26, 1818, issued by the Portuguese king 
while in Brazil, in compliance with the treaty established with England, banned 
this infamous trade under the penalty of forfeiting the slaves, who should be 
“immediately released.” After Brazil’s independence, the country signed a new 
convention with England in 1826, by which any traffi cking carried out more than 
three years after the exchange of ratifi cations would considered piracy. During the 
Regency [1831-1840], under pressure by the English, the ban was reiterated by 
law on November 7, 1831.
This intricate legal apparatus, however, remained a dead letter, because it 
had been enacted only “for the English to see,” as a popular Brazilian expression 
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has it. According to the great black lawyer Luiz Gama, who had himself been sold 
into slavery by his father when he was only ten,
shipments were unloaded in public view at selected points of the Brazil coastline, 
near fortresses in full sight of the police, without reserve or mystery; without 
any shame or embarrassment, the Africans were carried through the roads, sold 
in villages and farms, and baptized as slaves by the clerics, by the conscientious 
parish priests!… (in Menucci, p. 171)
The same Luiz Gama tells of an episode that occurred in the mid-1850s 
and is a perfect illustration of the widely accepted dubiousness of Brazilian law in 
this area.
In those days, a provincial farmer came to São Paulo, bringing letters of 
recommendation from political chieftains, in pursuit of two runaway slaves, who, 
being uncultured and unable to speak the country’s mother tongue, had been 
seized by a block inspector and granted freedom, in accordance with the Eusébio 
de Queiroz Act of 1850.3
 Having received no assistance from the local authorities, the farmer 
sought out the Court, where he conferred with the minister of Justice, the 
respected senator and counselor Nabuco de Araújo. Shortly thereafter, the 
provincial president received a “confi dential note” from the minister, in which 
His Excellency acknowledged that the negroes had been “properly apprehended 
and declared free by the chief of police, being Africans illegally imported into the 
Empire.”
The minister continued:
However, it should be taken into account that this incident, given the country’s 
present circumstances, is very serious and dangerous; it alarms the farmers, can 
upset their credit, become the cause of incalculable loss, and disrupt public order.
 The law was strictly enforced; there are, however, great interests of a higher order 
that cannot be overlooked and should preferably be considered. 
 If these negroes were to disappear from their current placement, with no 
prejudice to the good reputation of the authorities and without any liability of 
their part, what harm will result? (in Menucci, p. 184-5)
And that was indeed what happened, “with no prejudice to the good 
reputation of the authorities and without any liability of their part…”
In an insightful study on the manumission of slaves during the imperial 
period, Manuela Carneiro da Cunha (1986, p.123 ff.) leads us on the slippery 
slope of out-and-out ambiguity. All over the country, a tradition had consolidated 
of compulsory liberating slaves through the payment, either by the slaves 
themselves or by other parties, of the conventional price of redemption. Yet, 
there was never a formal, legal recognition of the captives’ entitlement to forced 
manumission. In his 1866 treatise on slavery, Perdigão Malheiro (§93 ff.) 
discusses the theoretical constitutionality of a law that recognized compulsory 
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manumission through the payment to slave masters of the cash redemption value 
of a slave, and makes it clear Brazil did not have at the time any law in this regard. 
It was only with the Law of the Free Womb, dated September 28, 1871, that the 
right of slaves to have their own savings, and thus acquire their own freedom, was 
fi nally admitted.
For Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, two juridical systems coexisted in 
Brazilian society in the 19th century: one based on written laws, the other on 
unwritten laws “pertaining to particular relations of dependency and power.” It 
was possible for both systems to coexist because their scopes of application were 
basically different: “to the free poor, essentially, the law; to the powerful, their 
slaves and their clients, the custom law.” Cunha concludes: “[the law] is also 
the external face, the international but not necessarily false face of a system that, 
domestically, differs.”
A better example could not be found of the typically Bovaristic quality of 
our ruling classes. Like Flaubert’s tragic character, they are always trying to fl ee 
our awkward and backward reality, which we fi nd shameful, and sublimate in 
the imagination, for the whole country and for each one of us in particular, an 
identity and the ideal conditions of life that we pretend to have, but which are 
actually totally foreign to us.
In this regard, we are the perfect embodiment of Fernando Pessoa’s “faker 
poet4.” We are so good at our act of faking that we actually think the ideal law 
that fi gures in our Constitution and Codes actually exists and is regularly obeyed.
Let us now examine a notable case of social schizophrenia: the notion of 
democracy.
The “Unfortunate Misunderstanding” of Democracy
When we split from Portugal, the idea of popular sovereignty was 
considered anathema to our ruling classes.
In May 1811, in the pages of the Correio Braziliense newspaper, published 
in London, Hipólito José da Costa insisted on making an emphatic warning:
No one desires useful reforms more than us; but no one is more annoyed 
than us that these reforms are made by the people, because we know the vile 
consequences of this mode of reform; we want reforms, but by the government, 
and we urge the government to carry them out while there is still time, so as to 
avoid having them made by the people. (Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, 1977, p.79-80)
More than a century later, we fi nd this statement being echoed by the 
then-president of the state of Minas Gerais, Antonio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada, 
who warned at the end of the Old Republic [1889-1930]: “Let us make the 
revolution before the people themselves make it!”
In Fallas do trono… (1889, p.6), addressed to the members of the 1823 
Constituent Assembly, Brazil’s fi rst emperor, D. Pedro I, referred with contempt 
to the country’s enemies, entrenched “in democratic Portuguese courts.” The 
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monarch then stated he expected the Constitution-in-draft to place “inaccessible 
barriers to despotism, whether real or democratic” (ibid, p.16). Shortly thereafter, 
on July 19 of that year, feeling the wind of the people’s (i.e., the municipalities’) 
rebellion blowing, D. Pedro I issued a proclamation with a warning:
Some Chambers of the northern provinces wherein reigns the democratic spirit 
have so instructed their deputies. Democracy in Brazil! In our vast and great 
empire, this is absurd; and no less absurd is their intention of prescribing laws to 
those who should make them, threatening them with the loss or derogation of 
power, which had not been granted them nor was it their due to grant.
It is true that the movement that led to the abdication of D. Pedro I, on 
April 7, 1831, was an attempt to conciliate liberalism and democracy. Shortly 
after, however, the liberal leaders backtracked and returned things to their proper 
places. The recantation of Teófi lo Ottoni was, in this aspect, paradigmatic. 
Excusing himself for his past liberal-democratic fancies, he stated that he had 
always sought “only peaceful democracy, a democracy of the middle classes, a 
clean-tie democracy, a democracy that rejects with equal disgust the despotism of 
the crowds and the tyranny of one” (in Bonavides & Amaral, 1996, p.204-5).
After the end of the Paraguayan War, however, the idea of democracy, or 
rather of a democratic republic, quickly expunged of any subversive connotation, 
started to be invoked in public, not as a system of popular sovereignty, but as a 
justifi cation for local-level political autonomy. Democracy and cognate expressions, 
such as democratic solidarity, democratic freedom, democratic principles and 
democratic guarantees, appear no less than 28 times in the Republican Manifesto 
of 1870. One of its topics is titled “The Democratic Truth.” Signifi cantly, 
however, not a word is said about the emancipation of slaves. It is known, by 
the way, that the leaders of the Republican Party opposed the Law of the Free 
Womb and only agreed to the abolition of slavery in 1887, when it was almost an 
accomplished fact.
On June 27, 1878, a recently graduated lawyer, still unknown on the 
national scene, gave a speech at the Provincial Assembly of Bahia that might 
today be attributed to any member of the party that answers by the name 
Democrats. His name was Ruy Barbosa and he emphatically said that, “liberty 
and equality are diametrically opposed and go together only in the mouths of 
demagogues and tyrants.” For him, the greatest threat to freedom was “tyranny 
[…] exercised by democracy against the individual.” Stressing the importance of 
the “human molecule, the vigorous, educated and free individual,” he said that 
political equality was always relative and dependent on “the inequality of social 
conditions” and the “inequality of natural abilities.” The demand for equality for 
all, he concluded, was nothing more than a refl ection of “corruption that comes 
from socialist error” (in Graham, 1990, p.184-5).
The country was living the onset of a movement for electoral reform 
and the abolition of indirect elections. The cabinet of prime minister João Lins 
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Vieira Cansansão, viscount of Sinimbu, tried to have the reform enacted by 
the Chamber of Deputies, and, in order to reassure the ruling class of great 
landowners, proposed to purge the votes of illiterate and increase the census (i.e., 
the minimum annual income required for voters to register).
That was when José Bonifácio, the Younger, entered the scene. He was a 
professor at the Law School of São Paulo, and also a representative at the time, 
and is certainly the greatest parliamentary speaker the country has ever known. 
When he ascended the rostrum of the Assembly on the afternoon of April 
28, 1879, the Chamber was bursting at the seams and the session had to be 
interrupted several times due to pressure from the huge audience that wished to 
enter the hall but was barred by security.
“Those who support this project,” he said, to intense applause,
after half a century of constitutional government, repudiate those who sent us 
to this Chamber, those who are the true creators of national representation. 
Why? Because they cannot read, because they are illiterate! This discovery 
is truly bewildering! The sovereignty of grammarians is an error of political 
syntax [laughter and applause broke out on the fl oor]. Who is the subject of the 
clause? [Prolonged hilariousness]. Is it not the people? Who is the verb? Who is 
the patient? Ah, they have discovered a new rule: the subject is not required. 
They divide the people, get themselves elected by a small minority, and then 
enthusiastically cry out: “Here is the national representation!” (in Holanda, 
1972, p.206)
Given the failure of the Sinimbu’s cabinet in enacting the constitutional 
change needed to abolish indirect elections, the emperor appointed - José 
Antonio Saraiva, known as the Messiah of Ipojuca, as prime minister. Saraiva 
went straight to the point and concentrated his efforts of persuasion in rescuing 
the democratic idea. In a session of the Legislature in 1880, he said: “We enjoy 
complete democracy in Brazil. […] We get along with everyone; we place the 
freedmen at our table and have more confi dence in trustworthy freedmen than in 
many of our own citizens” (in Graham, 1990, p.32).5
He just left out that, once slavery was abolished, we would then create a 
perfectly egalitarian society. Actually, it did not take long for this to be offi cially 
proclaimed. In his Message to the Legislative Congress of São Paulo, 1912-1916, 
Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves, who had been president of Brazil from 1902 
to 1906, stated in passing, as if it were a self-evident truth: “Amongst us, in a 
regimen of bona fi de democracy and complete absence of social classes…” (Egas, 
1927).
Left in the shadows, however, were the inconvenient facts that in the 
last election of the Empire, in 1886, voters represented less than 1% of the 
total population, and that in the election of Rodrigues Alves’ successor to the 
presidency they barely accounted for 1.4%. After all, despite the tiny electorate 
and the well-established practices of fraud, we had elections. Therefore, we 
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had democracy. “A democracy Brazilian-style,” as described by the general 
who ordered the arrest of the great lawyer Sobral Pinto in 1968, who replied: 
“General, I’ve only heard of turkey Brazilian-style.”
To be sure, in seeking to justify the coup of 1964, the military leaders 
did not hesitate to declare themselves representatives of the Brazilian people and 
exercise constituent power on their behalf.6 Later, with Institutional Act No. 
2 of October 27, 1965, Marshal Castello Branco and his ministers reproached 
the actions of “agitators of various breeds and elements of the deposed regime” 
who “threaten and challenge the revolutionary order itself precisely at the time 
when, alert to administrative problems, this order seeks to lead the people to 
the practice and discipline of the democratic exercise.” “Democracy,” the coup 
agents continued, “assumes freedom, but does not exclude accountability nor 
does it imply license to counter the political vocation of the Nation.” What they 
meant by “political vocation” is unclear, but we are to assume they referred to the 
regime established by the coup of March of the previous year…
This rhetoric of unwavering defense of democracy to cover every sort of 
crime reached its peak with the infamous Institutional Act No. 5, of December 
13, 1968, that opened the doors to State terrorism:
Considering that the Brazilian Revolution of March 31, 1964, in keeping with 
the Acts by which it was institutionalized, had foundations and purposes aimed 
at giving the country a regimen that, fulfi lling the requirements of a juridical 
and political system, would ensure a genuine democratic order based on freedom, 
respect for human dignity etc. 
If we turn our eyes to our present reality, we painfully recognize the 
permanence of that “unfortunate misunderstanding.”
The Persistence of the Democratic Misconception in the Current 
Political System
The Federal Constitution of 1988 begins with the solemn declaration that 
“the Federative Republic of Brazil […] is a democratic State of Law” in which “all 
power emanates from the people, who exercise it through elected representatives 
or directly, in the terms of this Constitution” (art. 1).
It so happens that this Constitution, as all the other ones that preceded 
it, was not ratifi ed by the people. Those who drafted it titled themselves 
representatives of those from whom all power emanates. But those who were 
supposedly represented, and in whose name the Constitution was written, had 
absolutely no awareness, when electing them, that they were doing so for this 
greater purpose.
Worse still, the said representatives of the people, when drafting the 
Constitution – as had invariably happened in the past – claimed exclusively for 
themselves the power to change it without consulting those they represented. As 
I write these lines, the 1988 Constitution was amended (or mended) no less than 
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63 times, a respectable average of more than three amendments per year. In none 
of these occasions did anyone remember to consult the sovereign people…
It goes without saying that, by attributing exclusively to themselves the 
power to change the Constitution – without even the slightest protest from 
anyone –, the parliamentarians became the true holders of sovereignty. By these 
means, therefore, we constitutionalized a dual political system: the actual, with a 
traditionally oligarchic nature; and the symbolic, of democratic expression.
Even a superfi cial analysis of other provisions of the 1988 Constitution 
confi rms the existence of this double regime.
Article 14, for instance, states that popular sovereignty is to be exercised 
not only by direct election, but also through plebiscites and referendums, and by 
popular legislative initiatives. In article 49, section XV, however, the Constitution 
includes, among the exclusive attributions of the National Congress, “to 
authorize referendums and call plebiscites.”
According to the prevailing view, such acts of authorization and 
convocation are an essential condition for popular sovereignty to begin to 
manifest itself. In other words, the sovereign mandators cannot express their 
political will except with the consent of the mandataries. What an undeniably 
original creation of the Brazilian legal mind!
On November 18, 1998, Law No. 9709 was enacted to regulate the 
aforementioned article 14 of the Constitution. In a recent ruling, the Regional 
Electoral Tribunal (TRE) of the state of São Paulo, with regard to a plebiscite 
approved by the town council of Santo André, stated that this law was not 
applicable because it referred only to national plebiscites and referendums. In 
conclusion, without the supervision of the Electoral Justice, the plebiscite could 
not be held.
Quite logically then, according to this praetorian interpretation, we 
must accept one of the following three assumptions: either 1) the fundamental 
principle of popular sovereignty in the Constitution can only be applied through, 
and strictly comply with, legislative regulation, that is to say, the principle has 
purely programmatic value; or 2) the plebiscite is not a manifestation of popular 
sovereignty, but a concession that Congress makes to the people; or 3) cities – and 
states as well, it follows – are not component units of the Brazilian federation and, 
therefore, it should be understood that the sovereignty of the people exists only at 
the federal level.
Not to mention the fact that the people’s representation in the Chamber 
of Deputies is determined by extremely disproportional voting ratios and by an 
electoral system structured on political parties that are now totally devoid of 
programmatic identity and public trust. And also not to mention the absurdity of 
giving the Senate greater political power than the Chamber of Deputies, since the 
Senate does not represent the unity of a sovereign people but rather the division 
of the Brazilian State into units formally deemed as equal despite enormous 
geoeconomic disparities.
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Given this, is it any wonder that Congress operates as an exclusive club, 
with its back to the people, whom it sovereignly ignores and neglects? Can 
it be a cause of surprise that the alienation of the political representatives has 
consolidated in their minds the belief that they are not liable to legal sanctions for 
their malfeasance, corruption and administrative improbity?
Some will counter the unsavory view of our political reality I have just 
presented by recalling the great advances in human rights championed by the 
1988 Constitution. Undoubtedly, it would be foolish and unfair to deny the 
ethical progress stemming from the written law. But has the written law by any 
chance eliminated the traditional duplicity of our juridical system? 
Let us consider a recent example. While the usurpatory deforcement of 
public lands in the Amazon is legitimized by means of a provisional measure,7 
the peaceful occupation of unproductive estates by landless peasants, or the 
settlement of homeless families in empty urban lots, is systematically and violently 
suppressed by the police and denounced by the media as a serious disturbance of 
public order.
A similar scam has taken place with regard to the freedom of expression. In 
the past, newspapers and magazines were indispensable tools to ensure freedom of 
speech and control the acts of public offi cials. Thomas Jefferson even stated that, 
if having to choose between a political system without newspapers or newspapers 
in a politically unorganized society, he would unfl inchingly prefer the latter.8 Yet, 
in the contemporary world, with rare exceptions, mass media has become the 
object of the oligopoly of capitalist enterprises, who detain undiluted power over 
public opinion. At present, the large social communication media denounces as 
censorship any legal attempt to regulate their programs,9 but do not hesitate to 
censor or distort the news that go counter their own interests, sometimes even 
omitting any reference to people who criticize them.
Ignoring this reality that strikes the eye, the Federal Supreme Court 
has recently ruled that the press law enacted during the military regime (Law 
No. 5250 of 2.9.1967) was tacitly repealed by the 1988 Constitution. With this 
decision that supposedly stands up for freedom of speech, the Court eliminated 
any type of legal control over the activities of the media, making its power to 
pressure government agencies and infl uence public opinion irrevocable.
Can this state of affairs be changed?
An Action Program
As noted, the functional duality of Brazilian law has deep, traditional 
roots in a power system that is essentially oligarchic. Its endurance over centuries 
has forged a complex of customs and a social mindset that is unabashedly 
conservative.
Yet, the replacement of this juridical system by another is not simply a 
matter of normative change. Legal rules only become effective, i. e., only acquire 
strength or social vigor (according to the meaning of the Latin etymon vigeo, 
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-ere), when imposed by an authority that was legitimately established and is 
legitimately maintained. When, in other words, they are effectively accepted by 
the people.
Everything revolves, therefore, around the dispensational status of 
sovereignty. Can we, in our country, replace the minority that has traditionally 
commanded the State with the people as a whole? And can we do it in a way that 
political power is exercised for the common good (res publica), not for special 
interests?
The answer to this question should stem from an analysis of power as a 
social phenomenon. As Max Weber (1985, p.28, 541 ff.) was able to show, power 
cannot be reduced simply to brute force, for it also comprises the voluntary 
obedience of those it submits. This obedience, as history has abundantly 
demonstrated, is based on an understanding of legitimacy, i. e., on the proper 
match between power relationships and the collective ethical sense. When the 
majority of society becomes aware of the irremediable injustice of the power 
system, the organization of power is already on its last legs.
This is, therefore, the action program that we, intellectuals, must be 
urgently carry out: it must become our priority to relentlessly denounce the 
absolute illegitimacy of the Brazilian political organization with regard to the 
great ethical principles.
Conclusion
In the funeral oration that Pericles delivered in memory of his kinsmen 
killed in the fi rst year of the Peloponnesian War, he eulogized Athenian 
democracy. Among other things, he said that the public men of Athens had their 
private businesses to attend to, and those engaged in the pursuits of industry were 
also fair judges of public matters. He concluded: “Unlike other nations, we regard 
him who takes no part in politics not as unambitious or peaceful, but as a useless 
citizen” (Thucydides II, 40).
I would dare say that Pericles’ assessment must be extended today. In our 
own time, anyone who stays aloof from politics to look after their private interests 
is a real menace to the public. Because it is precisely upon the indifference of 
the majority toward the common good of the people, on a national level, or of 
the commonwealth of all people, on a global level, that the modern system of 
voluntary servitude is built.
Dixi et salvavi animam meam.10
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Notes
1  Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist der Kapitalismus, originally published in 
1904/1905.
2  On this argument, see the invaluable study by Stuart B. Schwartz, Sovereignty and 
Society in Colonial Brazil; the High Court of Bahia and its judges, 1609-1751, published 
here in a terrible translation titled Burocracia e sociedade no Brasil Colonial (Schwartz, 
1979).
3  As is known, this law was enacted by the Assembly of the Empire fi ve years after the 
British Parliament ratifi ed the Aberdeen bill reiterating the qualifi cations of slave trade 
as piracy. The bill authorized the seizure of the slave ships and their human cargo, even 
in Brazilian waters, and the trial of the crew by the Admiralty Courts in London.
4 “The poet is a faker / Who’s so good at his act / he even fakes the pain / of pain he 
feels in fact” [translated by Richard Zenith]
5 It should be noted that freedmen did not have full rights as citizens.
6 See the so-called Institutional Act No. 1, of April 9, 1964: “The Leaders of the 
victorious revolution, owing to the actions of the Armed Forces and the unequivocal 
support of the Nation, represent the People and exercise Constituent Power on their 
behalf.”
7 Provisional measure no. 458, of 2009, became Law no. 11,952 of 6.25.2009.
8 Letter to Edward Carrington, sent from Paris on January 16, 1787, where Jefferson was 
ambassador: “The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very 
fi rst object should be to keep that right; and where it left to me to decide whether we 
should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I 
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter” (in Peterson, p.415).
9 To this day, more than twenty years after the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, there 
has been no regulation of articles 220 and 221, which deal with the suitability of radio 
and television programs to the great republican and democratic values. Likewise, the 
concession, licensing and authorization of broadcasting services remain still subject to 
personal interests of politicians and business corporations.
10 “I have spoken and thus saved my soul.”
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ABSTRACT - In every country, underlying the offi cial law comprising the Constitution, 
statutes, rules issued by the Executive branch, and legal precedents, there is always 
another hidden order, based on the structure of the ruling powers within society and 
legitimized by the social mindset. This duplicity of legal systems has always existed in 
Brazil. In addition to the offi cial law, which follows the operative standards of civilization 
of countries we consider to be culturally more advanced, there is also an unwritten law in 
force, aimed at protecting the interests of dominant social groups. This essay illustrates 
the twofold reality of Brazilian law with historical cases of slavery and democracy. In order 
to change this social structure, whose appearance does not refl ect the actual reality, the 
author stresses the need for a broad and continual denunciation of its illegitimacy.
KEYWORDS: Law, Brazil, Slavery, Democracy.
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